Psychology and the Law: Jury Deliberations

Unbeknown to most, jury deliberation rooms are goldmines for social psychology study. 12 Angry Men (1957) shows how jury deliberations are unknowably complex environments, rife with interpersonal communication and social interaction. Among such social interactions, a few social psychology theories and topics rise to the surface when peeling back the layers. Majority vs. minority influence is a staple of any jury deliberation session. Sides are taken, and those sides argue their cases against each other until one majority becomes unanimous (or the jury becomes hung) and a verdict is agreed upon. Within any group, especially one under as much pressure and scrutiny as a jury, the possibility of groupthink arises. When groupthink occurs, personal identities (and opinions) of the individuals in a given group melt into each other to support a relatively weaker argument which is born from “a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that results from ingroup pressures” (Neck & Moorehead 1). A possible way to combat groupthink is to make sure that the group is nice and diverse. The more heterogeneous a group is, the more tolerant of new opinions the group is, compared to a homogeneous group (hetero- or homogeneous in terms of any measure: race, socioeconomic status, family structure, religion, etc.).

Higher levels of diversity in groups can blossom into the fostering of complex ideas, creative solutions, and higher socialization among members. This is especially true in juries. “Full participation by jurors from diverse backgrounds allows the jury to draw on personal experiences, social perspectives, and knowledge that differ across individuals and social groups. … Diverse juries may engage in wider-ranging deliberations that include topics and considerations that might be missed, or even avoided by, less diverse juries” (Cornwell & Hans 668). Diversity in groups also helps to extinguish bias; variation in biases brought from different backgrounds ensures that no one dominant bias gets reinforced throughout discussion. Trait biases, “biases attributable to some stable characteristic or disposition of the judge” (Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer 690) are prevented from taking hold of the jury. Juries made up of a broad range of backgrounds help prevent “members of historically dominant status groups” from dominating discussion, as they usually do “in workplaces, classrooms, and experimental groups” (Cornwell & Hans 670).

Regardless of how diverse a jury really is, there always exists the possibility of one majority stifling discussion from jurors of a minority opinion. “Moscovici argued that influence attempts from majorities are likely to provoke public compliance due to the salient power of the majority” (Baron & Bellman 101). Representatives of a majority carry with them the weight of that majority, which Moscovici adequately acknowledged as one of the most powerful group forces. Whether it’s 11 jurors vs. 1, or 10 vs. 2, or 6 vs. 3 vs. 2 vs. 1, “... a nonunanimous decision rule can undermine attention to minority arguments” (Salerno & Diamond 174). Minority arguments get overlooked in favor of whatever the contenders are for the majority decision. One can easily imagine holding their tongue, reluctant to share a new opinion when the group they’re in is already debating two opposing viewpoints. If there are 12 jurors and 5 think X and 5 think Y, it tends to silence the 2 who think Z. But the question remains: “Are majorities influential because minority jurors simply succumb to normative influence or because of vote changes resulting from cognitive restructuring or group-level cognitive processes?” (Salerno & Diamond 174) This question represents the roots of social psychology. Are group dynamics a representation of each individual joined together or are they more than just the sum of its parts?

One such group-level cognitive process loss which begins with a strong majority influence is the phenomenon of groupthink. In Neck & Moorhead’s “Jury deliberations in the trial of U.S. v. John DeLorean: A case analysis of groupthink avoidance and an enhanced framework,” they discuss a unique situation in which many of the ingredients necessary for groupthink were present, but it did not manifest. Some antecedent conditions “that produce, elicit, or facilitate the occurrence of the syndrome” include insulation of the group, leader preference for a certain decision, homogeneity of members’ social background and ideology, high stress from external threats, and low self-esteem as a result of the group’s perception of recent failures (Neck & Moorhead 2-3). The jury responsible for delivering the verdict of U.S. vs. John DeLorean faced universal standards of jury deliberation which facilitate groupthink: “The general nature of the jury decision-making process creates a situation in which the jury members are highly insulated in that they are not allowed to be exposed to any information outside from what was heard during the trial and discussed in jury deliberations.” Like many high-profile cases, “jury members seemed to perceive external pressure from press, the judge, the lawyers, and the public in general” (Neck & Moorhead 5). The jury for the John DeLorean case had also grown close and very friendly, checking the “highly cohesive group” box for primary antecedent behavior. In addition to the outside pressure, halfway through their deliberations, the jury became deadlocked and experienced low self-esteem and internal pressure due to the failure that the group perceived this stalemate to be.

The stage is set for the jury to embark down the slippery slope of groupthink, but a few preventative factors provided ample footing for the group to avoid such a pitfall. Headstrong leaders are staples of groupthink situations. However, the foreman the jurors elected was actually a pretty reasonable guy who “outwardly voiced his concern over other members pushing their own preferred positions before listening to all sides of the issue” (Neck & Moorhead 5). If there ever was an archetypal leader designed to combat groupthink, it would be the foreman of this trial. The jury also adhered to Robert’s Rules of Order, which served as a strong framework of methodical procedure. This combined with a strong, but open minded, leader prevented the seeds of groupthink from germinating into anything besides surface-level antecedent conditions.

Jury deliberations, at this point in time, could use some work. Perhaps the addition of a designated moderator in the deliberation room (in addition to the jurors, not one of them) could help make sure that all thoughts and opinions are heard and considered. A moderator would combat the power of majority opinions by acting as a support for jurors who hold a minority opinion. Ensuring that everyone gets to speak their piece would provide more diversity in thought during deliberations. Proper juror selection is also important. This seems obvious, as the best jurors are the most impartial, but selecting jurors with the additional intent of promoting diversity would foster higher juror participation and prevent members of historically dominant status groups from monopolizing discussion with their biases.

Some negative facets of jury deliberation are unavoidable. Insulation from outside stimuli is a sensible requirement for juries, but at the same time is one of the antecedent conditions of groupthink. Isolating the jury from the outside helps maintain an impartial jury that has not been tainted by popular opinion, but it can also lead to an echo-chamber of similar opinions.

As deep and layered as jury deliberations are in terms of social psychology, the more one studies and examines them, the more apparent the flaws in the system become. Some of these cracks are located in the foundation of the judicial system, and would require a total overhaul of American judicial policy to fix. Clearly, this is not a reasonable solution. There are some auxiliary pieces of jury frameworks that could use some updating, but only time will tell if social psychologists’ voices are loud enough to be heard.

References

Baron, R., & Bellman, S. (2007). No guts, no glory: courage, harassment and minority influence. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(1), 101–124. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.341

Cornwell, E., & Hans, V. (2011). Representation through Participation: A Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations. Law & Society Review, 45(3), 667–698. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2011.00447.x

Kassin, S., Fein, S., & Markus, H. R. (2017). Social Psychology (10th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning.

Kerr, N., MacCoun, R., & Kramer, G. (1996). Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups. Psychological Review, 103(4), 687–719. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.687

Neck, C. P., & Moorhead, G. (1992). Jury deliberations in the trial of U.S. v. John DeLorean: A case analysis of groupthink avoidance and an enhanced framework. Human Relations, 45(10), 1077-1091. Retrieved from http://ezproxy2.library.drexel.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy2.library.drexel.edu/scholarly-journals/jury-deliberations-trial-u-s-v-john-delorean-case/docview/231416604/se-2?accountid=10559

Salerno, J., & Diamond, S. (2010). The promise of a cognitive perspective on jury deliberation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17(2), 174–179. https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.17.2.174